I thought this was worth talking about if for no other reason than it gives us a chance to discuss how America should deal with authoritarian countries that we have actual problems with. Whether you truly believe that Iran fits this mold is not relevant to a discussion of our policy regarding a hypothetical country. The question is how to deal with a country that is determined to acquire nuclear weapons and will not be dissuaded through incentives? We can use Iran as a test country.
The case of Iran is also problematic because they have direct access to American personnel in Iraq and are able to retaliate against any actions taken against them. Waddington proposes that the only way to get the leadership to relinquish interest in a nuclear program is to put their continued existence in peril. Unlike others, he is not inclined to do this through direct military action. Instead, he wants the United States tobegin packing certain groups he claims are pro-secular democracy. He buries the lead and his prescribed action is actually the last paragraph.
Most obviously, the EU and the U.S. need to lift their ban on the main Iranian Resistance group, the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran. It is ridiculous that the PMOI/MEK, a leading member of the NCRI coalition with grassroots support in Iran and for that reason feared by the Regime, should be hampered in its work as it strives to bring democracy to Iran. It is unreasonable that it should be so hampered when, as the Clinton Administration admitted, it was banned in the first place not because of American condemnation of its activities but in a futile and fruitless attempt by America to appease the Regime and reach out to so-called ‘moderates’ within it. Both the Proscribed Organisation Appeal Commission in Britain and the European Court of Justice have already ruled that the ban on the PMOI is unlawful and should be lifted. It is high time the international community gave its full backing to the body the Regime most fears, and sends a signal to the Iranian people that we support their efforts to bring about an end to the mullahs’ rule.
On the surface, this seems like an intriguing proposal. Support for indigenous prodemocracy forces seems like a good idea. This type of action should also sound familiar to people, as it is a throwback to the old school CIA actions of the 50’s and 60’s in Latin America. It is similar to the School of The Americas which unfortunately is notorious for producing death squads. This is the biggest issue that arises with this type of action. We never seem to pick the real prodemocracy groups. We seem to end up supporting groups that are just as or more repressive than what they are intended to replace.
What Waddington seems to be proposing would most likely end up being some type of puppet regime in Iran allied closely with the US. This would not be a good idea at all. Our history with this is so bad that if not for the tragedy of human life lost it might be comical. This poor job of selecting indigenous groups to support might actually be repeated here. I did some quick research on the group that Waddington was advocating we start supporting in the hopes of overthrowing or irritating the Iranian regime and the results were not good.
The group that Waddington cites, "reached a pinnacle of fame in the United States in August 2002, when Jafarzadeh held a news conference at the National Press Club in Washington and revealed that Iran had been building a nuclear facility at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak without informing the IAEA" (Slavin 2008 104). This fame has helped get their spokes people a continued platform to hype the dangers of nuclear Iran. However, this spokes person Alireza Jafarzadeh, lobbies in Washington and as a regular commentator on Iran for the Fox News Channel. Presence on Fox as an analyst should throw up some big red flags.
These flags are justified. The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), "encourages a cult of personality around its exiled leaders-Massoud and Maryam Rajavi- so extreme that two young girls burned themselves to death when Maryam Rajavi was briefly imprisoned in Europe in 2003" (Slavin 2008 104). Cults of personality do not generally indicate a proclivity for democratic action. By their nature, they focus on submission to the desires of the individuals in charge. This cult like tendency is also manifested in other ways as, "The MEK also obliges its members to live apart from their families and forbids young recruits from marrying, to encourage them to devote all their energies to the movement" (Slavin 2008 104). That does not sound like an organization we need to be backing. The problems with this group go even further.
The main reason for supporting an indigenous group is that you want to allow a popular democratic movement to flourish with the possibility of replacing the autocratic regime. That means that you want to have that group actually be popular. Apparently, this is not the case with the MEK. The have apparently lost its popular support in Iran after its leaders fled to Iraq in the 1980s and sided with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. Slavin states that, "In six trips to Iran since 1996, I have interviewed scores of Iranians about the MEK and found only one who had anything positive to say about the group. (A middle-aged man, whom I will not identify to protect him from his government, said he liked the fact that the MEK had killed many Shiite clerics affiliated with the regime.)" (2008 104). This really does not seem like a great group to be backing. What is the benefit here if they succeed especially as they have their origins in virulent anti-Americanism and hyper-nationalism?
The MEK is the ideal example of the problems associated with supporting the indigenous revolution. You rarely get what you hoped for with these groups. The idea seems sound in theory though so if you can find an org that truly represents the Liberal Democratic way and is popular that might be worth pursuing. Just pay attention to the possible long term ramifications of success.
If this group is not the best way to deal with Iran then what is? Shahram Chubin, of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, has written on this problem and provides valuable insight on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear desire. The general lessons can be applied to other nuclear ambitious states. The first step to dealing with a nuclear state is to understand why they want the bomb. That is a question that seems to go unanswered often. In the case of Iran Chubin asserts that Iran is seeking two things. The first is a regional superpower status and the prestige that comes from joining the nuclear club. The second is to erase the gap that exists between Iran and the West with regards to conventional military strength. ‘‘Iran has sought to avoid reliance on outside arms suppliers since 1988 when U.S. sanctions virtually grounded its air force,’’ Chubin states. ‘‘Ever since, missiles have been seen as a substitute for airpower, which is costly . . . and creates dependency.’’ The common theme here is a sense on insecurity and inferiority.
One thing to keep in mind is that the Middle Eastern countries, especially Iran used to be the military powers in the world until Gun Powder. Since that period they have been vastly inferior in terms of military technology and have been constantly subjugated by the West. Assuming that Chubin is correct about why Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, we also have to understand what they are going to do with it. According to Slavin, "Jafarzadeh’s prediction that if Iran gets the bomb, it will use it and even give such weapons to terrorists, crosses the line between analysis and propaganda" (2008 105). This would be a key idea that needs to be hammered home to prevent hard liners from derailing negotiations. Nor does it look likely Clinton would get to retaliate massively or obliterate Iran as, "for Iran to use the bomb against Israeli or U.S. targets would be suicidal. It is also unlikely, in the view of most experts on Iran, that the regime would share with foreign terrorists something it has withstood so much punishment to obtain" (2008 105). This puts a huge dent in the fear machine that the Bush administration has tried to build around the idea that Iran will help facilitate a 24 scenario.
If we believe that Iran is not going to give nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations and that they are not going to be launching a first strike against Israel then we can decide how to approach the Iranian nuclear issue. The solution needed is a comprehensive one that accepts that Iran, as a modern country, will always have the knowledge or capability to develop nuclear weapons. There are "40 countries in the world that have the capability, if they wish to use it, to build a nuclear weapon. They have the necessary infrastructure" ( Sick et al 2008 2). This means that part of the solution will be monitoring that allows advanced warning if Iran chooses to make that attempt at a weapon.
Our goal must be to get them to voluntarily stop making the advances towards the bomb. This might be more possible than some think. Iran has taken a very long time to develop a nuclear weapon. The embarked on their journey in 1985 and are still several years away. In contrast, "Most countries that went for a covert nuclear weapon — Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa — from the time they made the decision to do this until they actually had a device in hand, amounted to about five or six years" (Sick et al 2008 2). In today’s climate simply hinting that you want to start pursuing a nuclear weapon is enough to get international attention and pressure with the possibility of reward for giving up your non-existent program. This means that the first step is to talk to Iran.
We must talk to Iran for reasons beyond its nuclear ambitions. As a result of our actions, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq we have boosted the regional power and importance of Iran. We have single handedly removed both of Iran’s major enemies replacing one with a friendly government. It has also started a chain reaction causing increased tension in the region between Iran and other powers. "Ironically, the empowerment of Iran, in the many ways by which our policies have been able to expand its influence, has jolted Saudi Arabia out of its traditional diplomatic torpor and made it the other major driver of events in the region. It has been actively engaged with Iran in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, and of course in the Palestinian territories, where the Saudis have concluded they cannot leave the field to Iran" (Sick et al 2008 2). In addition to this the UAE is seeking to go nuclear as well with the help of the French.
What is also clear is that the US must be more committed to negotiations than the Bush people have been. The Untied states effectively undermined the talks between Iran and three European countries (the ‘‘EU3’’) Britain, France, and Germany that took place from 2003 until 2005 (Slavin 2008 106). The tale of US involvement in these talks smacks of hubris and incompetence like everything else in the Bush administration. "John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security in President George W. Bush’s first term, made no secret of his skepticism about the negotiations. He fell asleep-or pretended to-during a meeting in Washington in 2004 to which he had summoned European negotiators" (Slavin 2008 106). This is just appalling considering the seriousness of the topic. With all the proclamations of doom regarding Iran, Bolton acted like this during talks? This is simply unacceptable and must not be repeated.
Negotiations are also important because they might have the ability to improve human rights conditions in Iran. Human rights have become a hallmark of American foreign policy rhetoric coming from both sides of the isle. The increase tensions over the nuclear issue have led to a collapse of human rights in Iran as, "You are now seeing in some parts of Iran the Iranian government sanctioning not only executions without even a resemblance of due process, but also amputations and other extremely barbaric methods of punishment" (Sick et al 2008 5). As might be expected, increased tensions have led to the advent of a security state where fewer and fewer are willing to speak out and more and more pro-democracy and human-rights advocates are finding their room for maneuver limited (Sick et al 2008 5). This would make the original Waddington idea seem less plausible because the actual pro-democracy groups have been repressed. Negotiations would reduce tensions and actually lead to better human rights conditions regardless of any concessions on that issue we might extract in negotiations.
The key, imo, to the negotiations is something that many people would find almost impossible to believe. There was also an offer in May 2003 that was passed through the Swiss to the United States that offered comprehensive negotiations on all the matters of concern: the nuclear issue, terrorism, Israel and so forth (Sick 2008 8). I think that what we will see in regards to Iran is a solution much like we saw with China. Our current relations with China were a result of compromise and mutual interest. That possibility exists with Iran at this point in time. Full normalization of relations, including an end to sanctions, access to technology, and security guarantees. In return, Iran should renounce its efforts to master the fuel cycle, help stabilize Iraq, recognize Israel, and treat its own people better in terms of human rights.
The odds of the full transformation in Iran-US relationship is not particularly likely. There is an expected consolidation of conservative power in Iran that would make these advances unlikely. The conservatives have always seen the United States and the West at large as a source of cultural contamination and cultural imperialism.... They tend to view conservation of Iran's institutions — the supreme leader, the Guardian Council, and so on — as the most important to them. America's seductive cultural influences are still a source of concern" (Sick 2008 11). At the very least engaging in negotiations provides legitimacy to future US actions as it provides evidence of Iranian intransigence. Far from being a foolhardy policy entering into negotiations with Iran without the precondition of ending enrichment is required.
In doing research and reading on this I learned quite a bit. One thing that I found interesting was the lack of importance applied to Israel in the Iranian considerations. Israel just did not seem to be a big deal in any of the reading and was discounted in many. The more prominent country was actually India. India is a country we were more than happy to allow nuclear power status and this was insulting to Iran. A common statement was that Iran realizes that a strike against Israel would be suicidal. I also had one of my ideas confirmed. The rhetoric coming from the Bush and other hardliners is only making the problems worse. The incident in the strait of Hormuz is just one example. I hope this diary was worth reading.
Citations
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/...
Slavin, Barbara (2008) 'How Do You Solve a Problem Like Iran?', The Nonproliferation Review, 15:1, 103 — 107
Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007)
Sick, Gary, Trita Parsi, Ray Takeyh, and Barbara Slavin. "IRAN’S STRATEGIC CONCERNS AND U.S. INTERESTS." Middle East Policy Council. XV(2008): 1-18
